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Italy has only recently become a country of immigration. 
However, Italy is widely considered to be an ideal case 
for studying populism and, more recently, populist parties 
with anti-immigration stances. Within the context of the 
refugee crisis of 2015, this article aims to identify the dif-
ferent ways immigration is understood in populist rhetoric 
in the case of Italy. The analysis begins with an overview of 
the context of reference (i.e. immigration flows and immi-
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gration-focused policies), and continues with a theoretical 
overview of populism and anti-immigration stances. This is 
followed by an in-depth analysis of two specific manifesta-
tions of populism: the Northern League (LN) and the Five 
Star Movement (M5S). While the LN can be interpreted 
as one of the first political entrepreneurs of xenophobia 
and anti-immigration sentiments in the Italian arena, the 
M5S represents a perfect example of strategic investment 
in the topic of immigration, with fluctuating positions that 
can be considered side effects of the M5S’s attempts to 
synchronise its public stances with the voice of the people.
Keywords: Italy, populism, immigration, nativism, policies
1. Introduction
Throughout the postwar period, Western Europe experienced varying 
flows of immigration (Alonso & De Fonseca, 2011). However, European 
Union member states (MS) have witnessed a substantial increase in the 
number of immigrants in the last 40 years. According to Eurostat (2017), 
the number of residents in an EU country holding the citizenship of a 
non-member country represent 4.1% of the total EU-28 population (data 
on 1 January 2016). At the same time, the largest numbers of non-nation-
als living in a member state were to be found in Germany, followed by 
the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and France. In view of this, while the 
economic boom of the 1990s led to an increased demand for immigra-
tion across Europe, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and most notably in 
the post-2008 economic crisis period, both the MS and European Union 
(EU) institutions have strengthened their efforts to promote policies of 
securitisation of migration and borders (Slominski & Traune, 2018). In an 
increasingly multicultural European society, the sudden post-2015 surge 
in refugee numbers (i.e., with multiple origins and reasons for seeking 
asylum) has further increased the complexity of the immigration phenom-
enon (Triandafyllidou, 2017; Slominski & Traune, 2018).
Beyond the pressure on the EU’s institutional capacity to deal with these 
challenges, the literature has identified various consequences for national 
politics, including changes in electoral competition (Tarchi, 2015; Alonso 
& De Fonseca, 2011; Arzheimer, 2009; van der Brug et al., 2015; van 
der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Meguid, 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Mudde, 
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2007; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). In light of this, the literature univer-
sally acknowledges the relevance of immigration for the populist family 
of parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2008; Mudde, 2007; van der Brug 
& van Spanje, 2009). Across the EU, populist parties have succeeded in 
challenging the traditional topoi of the right, in terms of immigration and 
integration, to their electoral advantage, while simultaneously illustrating 
their ability to attract the blue-collar and unemployed votes that would 
otherwise go to the left of the traditional political spectrum (Bale et al., 
2010; Van der Brug et al., 2015).
Based on the above, our analysis addresses a straightforward research 
question: how have Italian populist parties related to immigration in the 
Italian public discourse in the post-2015 period? In an attempt to provide 
a convincing answer, we have limited our analysis to testing our intuition 
that, within the same polity, populist parties employ different argumenta-
tion registers in order to relate to immigration. The choice of the parties 
under scrutiny is not arbitrary. Our analysis focuses on the two most rel-
evant populist parties in the Italian context, the Northern League (Lega 
Nord, LN) and the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S). The 
criteria of relevance are based on the number of seats they hold (in the 
most recent legislative elections the LN obtained 18 seats and the M5S 
109 seats) and on their electoral appeal according to the most recent polls 
(i.e., an average estimate of a 27.9% likelihood to vote for the M5S and 
14.9% for the LN according to Termometropolitico.it 2017). Moreover, 
in both cases, anti-immigration stances are considered part of their rheto-
ric. While the LN can be interpreted as one of the first political entrepre-
neurs of xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment in the Italian arena, 
the M5S represents a perfect example of strategic investment in the topic 
of immigration, with its fluctuating position on our topic of interest. This 
shifting positioning can be connected to both the M5S’s attempt to syn-
chronise its public stance with the voice of the people in a sort of “live” 
political agenda and to their fluid organisational features.
Before proceeding with the analysis, one last caveat has to be mentioned. 
Following Gerring (2017), our comparison of two Italian sub-types of 
populist parties serves a descriptive function. The focus on the Italian 
case is linked to the widely held assessment in the literature that Italy has 
been a particularly fertile breeding ground for populist parties for over 
30 years (Tarchi, 2015; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2009; Mudde, 2007). 
Indeed, Italy has been characterised since 1992 by the constant parlia-
mentary representation of at least one populist party with a nativist dis-
course. Considering this last element, our descriptive case study focuses 
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on two sub-cases that together are intended to capture the diversity of the 
populist phenomenon (Gerring, 2017). More specifically, the LN case has 
been chosen by virtue of representing the most common features of popu-
list parties (i.e. a typical case), while the M5S represents a sui generis case.
Our research will make use of a qualitative content analysis of official 
statements and public discourse, as well as desk research. The analysis 
will be developed in four steps. The first two sections present an over-
view of the Italian context, providing the background information for the 
analysis of the evolution of policy-making on migration in Italy. The third 
part aims to provide an overview of the theoretical connection between 
populism and immigration. The fourth section focuses on the different 
definitions of immigration in the two cases under scrutiny. We conclude 
with an assessment of the implications of our findings.
2.  From an Emigration to an Immigration Country: 
a Recent History
Italy can be described as a new country of immigration. Recent migra-
tion movements, whose origins can be traced back to the early 1990s, 
have been described as forms of “mass migration”. Initially, it seemed 
improbable that Italy might become a major arrival point for international 
migrants and refugees. However, due to their geographical position, ports 
in southern Italy have become the first docking points for migrants from 
the North African coast. Within a few decades, Italy became the “Eu-
ropean dock” for refugees and migrants. Overburdened by this sudden 
change, over the last few decades Italian governments have addressed 
constant appeals for support to EU institutions and other member states. 
Despite a significant number of Italian citizens who still live abroad and 
a renewed interest in new forms of emigration (Tintori, 2017), the image 
of Italy as a purely emigration country does not fit reality. As Bonifazi 
describes it (1998, pp. 78-79), since the beginning of the 1800s Sicily and 
the southern regions had experienced the phenomenon of immigration 
from Greek and Albanian colonies. Similar flows were documented in 
the north-eastern regions, which attracted unskilled Slavic and Albanian 
workers. Since the early 1970s, immigrants arriving in Italy have become 
more numerous than Italian expatriates (Pugliese, 2002). However, the 
contribution of these arrivals to Italy does not change the reality of Italy 
as an emigration country.
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In order to understand this complex situation, it is necessary to look at 
the origins of the migration phenomenon in Italy. As a starting point, it is 
worth noting that the first systematic statistical data on emigration dates 
back to 1876. The total volume of Italian migration between 1876 and the 
beginning of the 1980s amounted to more than 26 million people (Boni-
fazi, 1998, p. 71). Between 1876 and 1885, most Italian migrants went to 
other European countries (i.e. France, Switzerland, the Austro-Hungar-
ian Empire, or Germany). Overseas migration evolved significantly after 
1885, primarily geared towards the United States, Argentina, and Brazil.
Between the start of the new century and the beginning of the Second 
World War, Italian migration – both continental and overseas – developed 
into a stable process and reached a peak of 600,000 expatriations per 
year. Compared with the period before, the fluxes were no longer pre-
dominantly composed of northern Italians. Citizens from the southern 
regions became involved in these migration flows, which decreased pro-
gressively during the years of the Second World War. The economic crisis 
of 1929 represents another factor of contraction. It is also worth noting 
that, before the dramatic events of 1929, Italy had witnessed the rise of 
the Fascist regime, whose demographic politics were aimed at stopping 
these flows of migrants (Ballinger, 2016). Despite the official discourse, 
Italians continued to migrate, although to a lesser extent compared to the 
end of the 19th century. In addition, the destination countries progressive-
ly introduced restrictions on migration. The implementation of restrictive 
legislation towards illiterate migrants and the introduction of quotas per 
country dramatically reduced the chances of Italian citizens migrating 
to the United States. This change explains the predominant continental 
character of migrations in the years of the Fascist regime.
With the end of the Second World War, a new phase of Italian emigration 
began. Most of the flows of Italians occurred on the basis of bilateral 
agreements, for example with Germany, France, and Belgium. While in 
the previous century northern regions had contributed most to Italian em-
igration, at the beginning of the 1950s workers from the southern regions 
became the most prevalent emigrants (Panichella, 2014). The reason for 
this change is to be found in the dynamics of the Italian economic recov-
ery, which was for the most part located in the north of the country. Be-
tween the beginning of the 1950s and the mid-1960s, roughly 1.5 million 
people changed residence every year in Italy. The city of Turin, for exam-
ple, grew dramatically (from 719,300 inhabitants in 1951 to 1,247,140 
in 1967); this increase was due to migration movements, predominantly 
from the southern part of Italy (Panichella, 2014, p. 66). 
132
Bulli, G., Soare S. Ch. (2018). Immigration and the Refugee Crisis in a New Immigration Country ...
HKJU-CCPA, 18(1), 127–156
CROATIAN AND COM
PARATIVE PUBLIC ADM
INISTRATION
The phenomenon of internal migration is of crucial relevance for post-
war Italy. Movement from the south to the (richer and more developed) 
northern areas contributed to a radical transformation of major cities, 
with direct consequences for cultural aspects such as the feeling of be-
longing, the perception of territorial identity, and shifts in the traditional 
political cultures. These transformations eventually fed the rhetoric of the 
LN, starting in the late 1980s. Migrants from southern Italy became the 
main target of xenophobic stances.
The transformations in the Italian landscape are connected with global chang-
es in this area. In the 1970s, the first signs of an economic recession and the 
1973 oil crisis contributed to a general change of attitudes and policies to-
wards immigration across Europe. Countries like Germany had to manage 
the complex effects of the so-called model of the Gastarbeiter, migrants who, 
it was intended, would leave the country of origin, settle down after a peri-
od of residence and eventually be joined by their families (Castles & Miller, 
2003). Other countries, like France and Great Britain, whose high levels of 
migration were connected to their colonial past, were confronted with an 
abrupt rise in anti-immigration feelings. Similar reactions could be found in 
Scandinavian countries too. In this case, unfavourable economic situations 
fed the rise of anti-tax parties, which would eventually develop into populist 
parties with open anti-immigration stances. In light of our topic, these trans-
formations also had an impact on Italian migration. Both the Italian econom-
ic recovery and this increasingly hostile environment to immigrants explain 
the further reduction of Italian migration in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In Italy, for the first time since records began to be kept in 1875, immigra-
tion exceeded emigration in the 1970s (Pugliese, 2002, p. 60). However, 
these figures do not take into account the number of returnees (emigrazi-
one di ritorno). Regarding the dynamics of internal migration, the 1973 oil 
crisis induced a considerable reduction of movement from the south of 
Italy to the north. In the mid-1970s, the flow of southern migrants to the 
big northern Italian cities stopped and was eventually replaced by migra-
tion towards the so-called area of the Third Italy (Bagnasco, 1977). This 
area was characterised by a particular setting of industrial development, 
centred on family-led small and medium manufacturing. All in all, by the 
end of the 1970s, Italian internal migrations had lost their predominant 
mass features. The new internal migration was more diversified, compris-
ing medium scale movements. Meanwhile, migrations abroad had also 
ceased to represent a relevant phenomenon.
These transformations may be seen as a side effect of the introduction of 
increasingly restrictive legislation in Northern European countries (i.e. 
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Great Britain (1971), Germany (1973), and France (1974)). There is no 
evidence, however, that the limited regulation in the Italian context might 
have contributed to the increased immigration. In most cases, the arrival 
of immigrants in Italy in the 1970s is connected with the collective entre-
preneurship of groups of people driven by the image of Italian economic 
prosperity. The economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s had made of Italy 
a “sound candidate to migration transition” (Einaudi, 2007, pp. 57-59). A 
less visible, although highly important, phenomenon is constituted by de-
mographics: a decrease in the overall population in parallel with an aging 
population with a growing income. Initially, this demographic aspect was 
not taken into account, having only been acknowledged in the mid-1980s. 
The real change in the configuration of immigration to Italy happened 
in the 1980s. Many scholars agree that immigration to Italy was an un-
planned phenomenon (Castelli Gattinara, 2016). Immigration to Italy did 
not result from a strategic decision to attract international workers, as in 
the case of the aforementioned German Gastarbeiter. The dynamics of im-
migration to Italy did not differ from the phenomena registered in other 
Southern European countries. The internationalisation and globalisation 
of markets along with the deepening of cultural exchange (Pugliese, 2002, 
p. 82) are among the triggers of an unexpected rise in the number of immi-
grants. Unsurprisingly, in the 1980s the increased number of immigrants 
rapidly attracted the attention of the media (Colombo & Sciortino, 2014). 
From the mid-1980s until the beginning of the 2010s, Italy registered a 
constant increase of foreign-born population. However, the extent of the 
phenomenon is very difficult to assess. On the one hand, official statistics 
do not take into consideration the presence of irregular migrants, who 
have represented a considerable proportion of foreign citizens in Italy 
since the late 1970s. On the other hand, despite the use of mixed models 
(Birindelli, 1990), available data remain uncertain. The available statis-
tical data show a constant increase from the end of the 1970s and again 
from the mid-2000s. With regard to 1977, research conducted by CEN-
SIS indicates an estimated number of foreigners ranging from 280,000 
to 400,000 individuals, out of whom 90,000 to 210,000 were irregular 
migrants. Almost thirty years later, according to the dataset collected by 
Blangiardo, 3,357,000 foreigners and 541,000 irregular migrants were re-
corded in 2005. 
The 2010s have been marked by the so-called refugee crisis. The Syri-
an civil war induced the largest movement of asylum seekers since the 
Yugoslavian wars. As indicated by Eurostat data, in 2016 Italy was the 
second most affected country with regard to first-time asylum seeker ap-
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plications, while the top position was occupied by Germany. In 2017, 
these applications were linked to citizens originating from Nigeria, Bang-
ladesh, Pakistan, the Ivory Coast, and Gambia. Needless to say, the most 
relevant phenomenon regarding Italy is the arrival of immigrants by sea.
In view of this, the framing of migration as an emergency is directly con-
nected to 3 October 2013, when a boat carrying migrants from Libya 
sank near the Italian island of Lampedusa, with over 360 human casual-
ties. Since then, countless shipwrecks have marked the political debates 
around this issue. The governments led by Enrico Letta (Democratic Par-
ty, PD) and later on by Matteo Renzi (both of them being Prime-minis-
ters on behalf of the PD) have regularly referred to the need to invest in a 
common European strategy in order to induce EU member states to take 
joint responsibility. Across the EU, the failure of the European agenda on 
migration has further intensified the politicisation of migration (Bauböck, 
2017). 
In the aftermath of the domestic political crisis of 2016, a new government 
led by Paolo Gentiloni was appointed. A change in the management of 
immigration can be identified in the period that followed. First, a govern-
mental decree on migration was approved in 2017 (the Minniti-Orlando 
decree), with the aim of curtailing illegal immigration. More important-
ly, there was investment in the externalisation of border control through 
the involvement of third-party countries, as exemplified by the agreement 
signed with Libya in the summer of 2017. The agreement confirmed the 
position of Libya as a buffer country, in charge of both stopping and de-
terring migration. At the same time, the Italian government put pressure 
on the NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Sea to sign a 13-point code 
of conduct, including a commitment not to enter Libyan territorial waters 
and to allow police to board and investigate vessels (Ministry of the Inte-
rior, 2017). 
Considering these measures, the UNHCR (UNHCR Europe monthly 
report 2017) has identified a considerable drop in the number of refugees 
and migrants arriving by sea: as of 30 September 2017, there has been a 
64% drop compared with the same period in 2016, predominantly among 
Nigerians, Guineans, Bangladeshis, Ivorians, and Malians. However, the 
political debate remains particularly lively on the issue of migration. This 
is illustrated by the clash between humanitarianism based elements and 
those elements that emphasise the pre-eminence of order and the rule of 
law.
135
Bulli, G., Soare S. Ch. (2018). Immigration and the Refugee Crisis in a New Immigration Country ...
HKJU-CCPA, 18(1), 127–156
CR
OA
TIA
N 
AN
D 
CO
M
PA
RA
TIV
E P
UB
LIC
 A
DM
IN
IST
RA
TIO
N
3.  Legal Overview
The shift from a country of emigration to a country of immigration did not 
coincide with a political debate on the consequences of this transforma-
tion (Einaudi, 2007, pp. 100–101). During the late 1960s and 1970s, pol-
icy-making on migration was focused almost exclusively on issuing partial 
emergency measures. The lack of a specially designed law on migration im-
plicitly encouraged the irregular features of migration. Most migrants en-
tered Italy with a tourist visa and subsequently remained under unofficial 
working conditions. This situation exacerbated negative reactions towards 
irregular migrants and helps to explain the adoption of specific measures to 
combat migration adopted by local administrations (Einaudi, 2007, p. 105). 
This situation continued throughout the 1980s, during which clear signs of 
growing hostility towards internal and international migrants emerged. The 
issue started to become politicised, although not yet targeted by a national 
law. The increased tension must be connected with the worsening of Italian 
economic conditions, such as increased unemployment, since the begin-
ning of the 1970s. All in all, in a period when most EU member states took 
their first steps towards preventing further immigration, Italy was yet to 
start the drafting of its first harmonised legal provisions on this issue. 
The first comprehensive legislative act on immigration was passed in 1986 
(the Foschi Law 943/1986). The act enshrined the equality of treatment 
between Italian and foreign workers and was based on a highly unrealistic 
evaluation of the administration’s capacity to manage the complex relation 
between supply and demand in terms of the labour force. The result was a 
wide amnesty towards irregular migrants (Melchionda, 2015, p. 29), which 
subsequently ended in 1988. Despite the regularisation act, during this pe-
riod the number of illegal migrants grew substantially. Meanwhile, the issue 
of immigration gained increased public and media attention. This was also 
due to the agenda-building action of new political players; i.e., the regional 
leagues in northern Italy, the forerunners of the Northern League. These 
regional political forms of entrepreneurship put the topic of migration 
(both internal and from outside Italy) at the centre of their programmes. 
The end of the 1980s was marked by international turmoil due to the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. Within a few years, Italy experienced the end of 
the party system that had characterised the so-called Prima Repubblica 
(First Republic, 1946–1994). At the same time, Italy had to deal with 
an unprecedented flow of migrants originating from former communist 
countries. The Italian collective memory was shaped by the arrival of the 
cargo ship “Vlora”, packed with thousands of Albanians, on the coast of 
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the Puglia region. From this moment onwards, Italy was to experience a 
profound change in the composition of its foreign population. The per-
centage of Eastern Europeans grew quickly, and the number of African 
migrants diminished. 
Meanwhile, the social environment was changing rapidly. At the legisla-
tive level, there was the adoption of the Martelli Law (1990). Named after 
its promoter, Claudio Martelli, the Deputy Prime Minister (Socialist Par-
ty, PS) at the time, the new legal text aimed to balance the humanitarian 
stances endorsed by the Catholic Church, the network of NGOs working 
in the field of immigration, and the trade unions with the harsh criticisms 
voiced by the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) 
of the radical right and the Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano, PRI). 
Overall, the text of the law was largely favourable to irregular migrants, 
who were able to benefit from amnesty on the largest scale ever imple-
mented in Italy. Moreover, the 1990 law abolished the so-called “geo-
graphical reserve” for asylum seekers, making it possible for a refugee to 
be recognised as such independently of his or her geographic provenance. 
With regard to the labour market, the Martelli Law introduced the con-
cept of “sponsorship” by associations and institutions, issued an annual 
decree on immigration quotas, and introduced the practice of expulsion.
Part of the 1990 legal provisions were included in the organic law on 
immigration which followed, the so-called Turco-Napolitano Law, adopt-
ed in 1998. Issued by the centre-left government, the Turco-Napolitano 
Law aimed to regularise the position of immigrants: the text introduced 
a complex scheme for the deportation of illegal immigrants. Moreover, 
the 1998 legal text introduced a complex system of quotas and the legal 
framework for bilateral agreements (Einaudi 2007, p. 216). Last but not 
least, the Turco-Napolitano Law attempted for the first time to develop a 
large-scale system of integration.
In parallel with the electoral campaign for the 2001 legislative elections, 
the centre-right coalition successfully invested in anti-immigration dis-
course (Castelli Gattinara, 2016). Unsurprisingly, the Northern League 
was the dominant voice on this topic, supported by the National Alliance 
(Alleanza Nazionale, AN). As a direct consequence, Umberto Bossi (the 
leader of the Northern League) and Gianfranco Fini (the leader of AN) 
endorsed the next law on immigration. Passed in 2002, the law reduced 
the impact of the provisions of the Napolitano Law, particularly regarding 
the duration of residence permits, and introduced a more restrictive appli-
cation of family reunification norms and a longer period of permanence in 
centres for the verification of migrant identity. Moreover, a link between 
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the ownership of a residence permit and the possession of an employment 
contract became a necessary condition for the regularity of a migrant’s 
stay. In September 2002, a decree-law issued by the government provided 
an opportunity for the regularisation of the position of two main types of 
irregular immigrants: caregivers and domestic workers. Despite increased 
restrictions, the general features of the earlier law had not been fully dis-
mantled (Einaudi, 2007, p. 311). The legal framework still lacked a policy 
concerning refugees and asylum seekers.
Criticisms voiced by the national and international community increased 
in the context of the so-called “security package”, a group of legal provi-
sions introduced under Law 94/2009 by a new centre-right government. 
The promoter was the Minister of Internal Affairs at the time – Roberto 
Maroni, a leading figure of the Northern League. In a context generally 
characterised by an aggressive media discourse against migrants, the most 
problematic provision concerned the deployment of soldiers in cities, open-
ly targeting Roma people. The legal text also introduced the crimes of ille-
gal migration and illegal residence. The text was widely condemned by the 
Italian Church, the third sector, and European institutions, in particular 
the European Court of Justice. Eventually, the Italian Constitutional Court 
fine-tuned part of the most restrictive measures (Castelli Gattinara, 2016).
All in all, the Italian context was characterised by a constant tension be-
tween the pressure applied by NGOs, trade unions, and the Church in 
favour of the preservation of migrant rights on the one hand, and the crit-
ical stances of the political elites on the other, particularly regarding the 
limited capacity of the Italian labour market to absorb the migrants. Over 
the last two decades, the association between immigration and insecurity 
has shaped political discourse and legal provisions in this area.
4.  Anti-Immigrant Stances and Populism:  
a Theoretical Overview 
Having provided a general overview of migration in Italy, we can now 
move on to the specific topic of our analysis: populist parties. In order to 
depict the features of the two parties under scrutiny, an overview of the 
key assumptions in the literature is necessary. Over the last two decades, 
beyond the different empirical applications and nuances, one of the most 
consolidated lines of analysis has depicted populism as a “thin-centred 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two ho-
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mogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt 
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Accordingly, 
populism pervades traditional ideological frontiers, includes left or right-
wing ideological issues, the direction of this grafting and its intensity de-
pending upon the socio-political context within which the populist parties 
mobilise (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Thus, populism is intrinsically cha-
meleonic (Taggart, 2000). The core issues of populist discourse change 
across time and space. References to the pure people, the corrupt elite, 
and the volonté generale are considered necessary and sufficient conditions 
to classify a phenomenon as populist (Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 479).
If we adhere to the definition of populism as a thin ideology or, in Tarchi’s 
words, a way of thinking and feeling that values emotions over reason, 
most of the recent literature agrees upon an additional characteristic: the 
exclusionary nature of European populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). 
This exclusionary dimension is connected with the nucleus of populist 
discourse, meaning the homogeneous community and, on the other hand, 
a list of enemies that ranges from political to economic elites, as well 
as from national to international representatives. The European populist 
radical right family voices a xenophobic form of nationalism that praises 
the ideal of a mono-cultural nation-state in which non-natives are depict-
ed as a source of threat to the community of reference. Furthermore, this 
nativism is connected with a belief in the need to promote a stringent en-
forcement of order and discipline within a neat and well-functioning soci-
ety. Finally, it includes a Manichean vision of society, according to which 
it is divided between the pure people and the corrupt elite, and in which 
the general will of the people is to be worshipped (Mudde, 2007). In light 
of this, the prevalent representation of the migrant is based on a rather 
simplistic image of the other, alien to the organic groups of the national. 
Populism’s imaginary of the people’s enemies is particularly rich. The pop-
ulist rhetoric is intimately linked to whom it portrays as an enemy. The 
denunciation of immigration is combined with the request for increased 
law and order (Bale, 2003). Unsurprisingly, populist radical right parties 
have become major players in the electoral competition, boosting the sa-
lience of immigration issues beyond the political arena (Helbling, 2014; 
Koopmans et al., 2005). Their anti-immigration stances have been used 
by the literature in order to explain the electoral appeal of populist radical 
right parties to both traditional right-wing voters and left-wing blue-col-
lars, who all feel increasingly threatened by cultural and economic globali-
sation (Bale et al., 2010; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995).
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5.  There are Many Rooms in the House  
of the Italian Populists
Drawing on this general theoretical overview, we can now focus on the 
two cases of interest. Although they share the same veneration of the 
people and use the same rhetoric, based on the simplistic division of so-
ciety into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the populist genus 
provides different interpretations of the people and the menaces faced by 
the people.
5.1.  The Northern League: The Nativist Interpretation  
of Immigration
The Northern League was founded in the 1980s in a context of increased 
disaffection with party politics dominated by a coalition between the 
Christian Democrats, the Socialist Party, and other minor parties on 
the one hand, and the Communist Party on the other (Cotta & Isernia, 
1996). In the 1980s, the emergence of regional leagues, which eventu-
ally formed the LN in 1989, echoed the intensity of the dissatisfaction 
with the state of collusion between political parties and economic inter-
ests (Tarchi, 2015; Lazar, 2013; Fabbrini, 2009). The corruption scandal 
that shed light on the capillarity of the network of patronage and clien-
telism controlled by the main parliamentary parties further diminished 
the credibility of the parties that dominated post-war Italian politics and 
put an end to the so-called First Republic (1948 and 1993) (Lazar, 2013). 
The shift from a consensual democracy to a model of democracy based 
on competition (in the so-called Second Republic, from 1993 onwards) 
failed to be supported by a synchronised reorganisation of the system of 
interest representation or coherent institutional reform (Fabbrini, 2009). 
In view of this, the Northern League progressively reinforced its electoral 
relevance by voicing its resentment against the establishment and pro-
moting a populist critique of the usual way of doing politics (Albertazzi & 
McDonnell, 2010).
From a conceptual point of view, the populist features of the Northern 
League have been a subject of disagreement in the literature (Mudde, 
2007). Mastropaolo acknowledges the complexity of the League’s pro-
gramme and considers it an anti-political party (2005). The founder of the 
League, Umberto Bossi, initially claimed that the League was a popular 
movement and not a party (Woods, 2014). All in all, we consider the 
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League suitable for inclusion among the populist family and in particular 
within the sub-group of radical right populism characterised by a combi-
nation of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 2007). Since 
1989, despite changes in content, the LN has maintained its main line of 
argumentation: the opposition between the virtuous and homogeneous 
people and the corrupt elite (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2010).
In consistence with the literature, at the centre of the LN discourse it is 
possible to identify the opposition between “us”, the honest, hard-work-
ing, and simple-living northern Italians (McDonnell, 2006), and the cor-
rupt elite in Rome. In the first two decades of its existence, the LN val-
orised the ethnic and linguistic distinctness of the northern community 
as the basis for justifying a broader project of administrative decentrali-
sation (Tarchi, 2015; Woods, 2014). In this context, the criterion of ex-
clusion mainly referred to the southerners. The organic community of the 
northerners, under the leadership of Umberto Bossi (1989-2012), was de-
scribed as a homogenous group of hardworking entrepreneurs and people 
overburdened with taxes, whose efforts and sacrifices were being misused 
by the Italian elite to benefit the lazy southerners (Fella & Ruzza, 2010). 
The solution to this uneven distribution of northern wealth was portrayed 
in terms of the implementation of extensive federal reforms. This was the 
basis on which the topic of immigration gained progressive visibility.
Considering the context of immigration in the 1990s and the prevalence 
of immigrants from post-communist countries, LN discourse broadened 
its register of enemies by including a tough denunciation of the dangers of 
immigration (Tarchi, 2015). As illustrated by the literature on radical right 
populism, immigrants were depicted as the reason for all of society’s ills, 
ranging from economic aspects such as unemployment and the reduction 
of wages to issues such as the proliferation of crime and insecurity. For a 
while, the Northern League mobilised resentment against the post-com-
munist immigrants. Referring to vaguely defined non-EU citizens, the LN 
cultivated what Pappas calls a sense of victimhood (2012): the organic 
community of the natives being abandoned by cosmopolitan elites to an 
invasion of immigrants. Accordingly, the Northern League denounced the 
inability of the Rome based elites to meet the needs of the local communi-
ty, meaning the northern community, and openly stigmatised immigrants 
as criminals. This was particularly true for the Roma community. In parallel, 
the denunciation of increasing the number of immigrants was offset by the 
so-called welfare chauvinism and the critique of the excessive use of Italian 
welfare state provisions for the immigrants (Del Vigo & Ferrara, 2015, p. 
187). Hence while cultivating political stances in favour of fiscal decentral-
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isation and liberal policies in the economy (in particular in connection with 
the governmental collaboration with Forza Italia), the LN progressively in-
cluded left-wing welfare economics on its agenda. However, it was made 
explicit that access to welfare was to be restricted to the natives.
In the aftermath of 9/11, a cultural denunciation of immigration was 
further included in the rhetoric of the LN. The cultural threat became 
increasingly synonymous with anti-Islam stances (i.e., opposition to the 
building of mosques, the denunciation of the veil, etc.). Without aban-
doning the previous characterisation of the threats posed by post-com-
munist immigration, under the leadership of Salvini (from 2013 onwards) 
immigrants have increasingly been portrayed as a religious threat, a se-
curity menace, and last but not least, an economic burden. At the same 
time, the community of reference has been slightly amended. The original 
emphasis on northerners first has been abandoned in favour of a national 
definition of the virtuous and unified community. This national communi-
ty has been regularly depicted as being “under threat” because its culture, 
religion, values, security, and economic benefits are betrayed by the cor-
rupt elites in Rome conspiring with technocrats in Brussels. Since 2012, 
the party has increasingly used interconnected elements such as opposi-
tion to immigration and criticism of the European Union in order to both 
increase its resonance at the national level and reinforce its alliance with 
other radical right populist parties such as the National Front in France, 
the Freedom Party in Austria, and the Party for Freedom in the Nether-
lands. Meanwhile, in an attempt to shore up electoral support, the Salvini 
leadership lessened the emphasis on the northern community and in 2014 
endorsed the creation of a southern counterpart, “Us with Salvini”.
Under Salvini’s leadership and in the period of chief interest for this pa-
per, the post-2015 years, the League has preserved its virulent nativism 
towards immigrants, always accompanied by a denunciation of the Rome 
based elite’s collusion with EU technocrats and criminal networks, which 
penalises the community of native Italians. However, a look at the official 
text “Immigration: General Guidelines, the North League”, published in 
February 2015 by the head of the party’s Federal Department of Security 
and Immigration, shows that the official discourse seems to have somehow 
diminished its virulence against immigration (LN, 2015). Indeed, out of 
the 18 pages of text in the document, the first seven place an emphasis on 
the Northern League’s positive assessment of regular immigration (p. 3). 
These stances are far from surprising, considering populists’ great respect 
for order and discipline. In the first eight pages, the document provides 
an overview of the Italian legal context and presents different statistics on 
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growing immigration in Italy. The second part of the document deals with 
illegal immigration and asylum requests, and provides details about the 
department in charge of immigration and security within the Northern 
League. On this last point, it is important to note the leading position of 
Tony Iwobi, a party member of Nigerian origin. The department coordi-
nates a wide network of regional branches, present in 17 of the 20 Italian 
regions. 
The core of the official position remains vague, with a general stance on 
the need to fight illegal corruption and the criminal networks acting in 
this field. As in the previous paragraph, the official position is straightfor-
ward. According to the party’s official documents, it is time to say yes to 
those who respect Italian law and to say no to those who do not respect 
it; similarly, it is time to accommodate the demands of those who have 
an honest job and consequently the right to reside on Italian soil and the 
duty to contribute to Italy’s economic and social growth. Last but not 
least, it is time to put a distinct stop to clearly irregular or clandestine 
immigration due to situations of extreme degradation and illegality (LN, 
2015, p. 10). 
Although it says little about immigration per se, the text is interesting be-
cause of its implicit reference to the importance of adapting and contrib-
uting to the well-being of the community of the native group. However, 
in this case, the nativist dimension does not include explicit xenophobic 
positions. Despite this, it is important to underline the focus on immigra-
tion that owes its obedience to the established authorities and has respect 
for the law. The predicted solutions include a denunciation of the EU’s 
insufficient involvement in the refugee crisis.
These synthetic and even bland stances on immigration were already visi-
ble in the League’s 2014 official electoral programme (LN, 2014). Of the 
38 pages of text, only one is dedicated to the issue of immigration. In this 
case, the issue of immigration is directly connected with the denunciation 
of those who have usurped authority over the national territory from the 
national community: the elites in power and the European Union. Con-
sidering the context of reference, namely elections for the European Par-
liament, the League programme uses immigration as a proxy for asserting 
national sovereign control over national laws and institutions. The EU is 
consequently depicted as an organisation that hinders the ability of the 
native community, and thus the genuine will of the people, to control its 
territory and decide upon the rules of immigration therein.
However, the virulence of the discourse on immigration has increased in 
interviews with the press. In a radio interview in May 2017, Salvini, the 
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LN’s leader, pointed to the need for legal action against immigration, 
framed as an invasion, a clear attempt towards ethnic cleansing, the eth-
nic substitution of those who live in Italy. A culturally based denunciation 
of immigration is increasingly a part of the League’s discourse. Regarding 
the proposal to amend the Italian citizenship law, Salvini ostentatious-
ly declared his opposition to the Pope’s endorsement of the proposed 
amendment of the law on citizenship. Provocatively, he invites the Pope 
to apply the amended version of the law in the Vatican State. Moreover, 
Salvini places an emphasis on his Catholic faith and his understanding 
that Italy cannot host and sustain the whole world. His public statement 
concludes with a challenging quotation of Give to God what belongs to God, 
and to Caesar what belongs to Caesar. Amen (Ius soli, Salvini, August 2017). 
Salvini’s staunch anti-immigration stances emphasize an exclusionary vi-
sion of Italian culture by explicitly appealing to Catholicism and thereby 
targeting the unwanted “alien” elements, the immigrants, as dangerous 
for the culturally/religiously homogenous community of the natives. 
The nativism of the League has increasingly become a combination of na-
tionalism, xenophobia, and anti-immigration stances. Following this log-
ic, immigrants are the agents of an invasion that violates, dismantling the 
“natural” ethnic and cultural order. Consequently, the League portrays 
itself as the only legitimate defender of the community of the natives, 
protecting not only its economic and social well-being but also its cultural 
integrity and purity from this massive invasion of foreigners. The League 
connects these dangerous foreigners mainly with Islam.
This link made by the League between Islam and an “invasion” is illustrat-
ed by a declaration of Salvini’s in early 2017. He provides a very simple 
and simplistic metaphor: if you come to my house, you knock and ask for 
permission; if I agree I’ll let you in, otherwise I will not let you in. The op-
position to this wave of immigration is justified by the fact that too many 
Muslims interpret the Koran as a book of war and violence. He openly 
assesses Islam as the public danger number one. Moreover, he states that, 
because of their faith, the Muslim community is lagging behind centuries. 
He roughly concludes that they should stay at home and no new mosques 
should be opened in Italy (Salvini: “Islam pericolo numero uno, restino a casa 
loro”, 2017 January, 31). 
The League’s discourse increasingly employs an Islamophobic repertoire 
and emphasizes the role of Catholicism in the community’s history. Is-
lam is portrayed as opposed to both the community’s Christian roots and 
Italian democracy (Salvini, 2016, p. 107). Salvini openly declares that the 
only religion he has an issue with is Islam, because it brings problems to 
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Italy (del Vigo & Ferrara, 2015, p. 206); Muslims are portrayed as those 
that make use of the system in order to dismantle the native culture and 
induce a reversal to a mediaeval way of life. In his 2016 autobiography, 
Salvini declares that the “problem of Islam” has to be tackled by “jealously 
protecting our values and our traditions” (Salvini 2016, p. 107). 
It should also be noted that over the past year, anti-immigration discourse 
has increasingly included a denunciation of the connection between or-
ganised crime and illegal immigration, with a stronger focus on the nega-
tive role of the NGOs acting in this field.
Over time, without abandoning the discourse based on the community 
of the northerners, the League has broadened its community of reference 
by strategically including all native Italians in direct connection with a 
combination of economic, social, and political threats that continue to 
be located at the level of Rome based elites and technocrats in Brussels. 
On this basis, while immigration was initially targeted as an economic, 
social, and cultural menace to the community, the cultural – namely reli-
gious – dimension has become prevalent. “Anti-immigration” has become 
synonymous with “anti-Islam”, although it is worth mentioning that not 
all other negative types of impact have been abandoned. Immigration reg-
ularly emerges as a polyhedric concept used as a proxy for contemporary 
problems in society. Immigrants are blamed for negative effects on the 
uniqueness of the native civilisation and values, on the future of liberal 
democracy in Italy, on the economic system, and in particular, on the 
availability of welfare for the native population.
5.2.  The Five Star Movement
The Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S) represents one 
of the most relevant changes to the Italian party system since the collapse 
of the First Republic. There is no universal agreement on the ideological 
features of the party within the literature. The circumstances of its birth 
and evolution represent a serious obstacle to understanding the aims of 
the movement. Uncertainties concerning the policy goals of the M5S are 
also widespread, because the official party programme is mostly repre-
sented by the contents of the political blog of Beppe Grillo – the founder 
of the movement. Among these uncertainties, the positioning of the M5S 
on the issue of immigration is particularly evident. 
The M5S was variously described as a representative of a kind of “left 
populism” in an earlier stage of its evolution, during which a considerable 
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part of its voters came from the ranks of traditional left-wing voters (Pe-
drazzani & Pinto, 2013, p. 105). Later on, as it gained 25% of the elec-
torate in the most recent parliamentary elections, held in 2013, the basis 
of the party began to be described as composed of protest voters, mostly 
interested in sending a clear anti-establishment message to the traditional 
parties. There is no general agreement on the movement’s identification 
as a populist party. Tarchi (2015, 355) does not share the interpretation 
of other authors who describe the party as purely populist. Chiapponi 
(2017) defines the M5S as the latecomer of the Italian populists. Other 
academics point to particular elements of a populist mobilisation (Biorcio 
& Natale, 2013; Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013; Cosenza, 2013), which 
underlie the effect of a sort of a composition of protest created by the use 
of Manichean language, the charismatic leadership of Beppe Grillo and 
Giandomenico Casaleggio (the “ideologue” of the movement, who died in 
2016), and the use of anti-establishment topoi. 
Leaving behind the disputes regarding the populist character of the M5S, 
it is worth briefly describing the circumstances of its creation and evolu-
tion in order to depict the role given by Beppe Grillo to the sharing of the 
programmatic points with the people of the movement (the party mem-
bers) on a variety of issues, including immigration. Beppe Grillo is a well-
known Italian comedian. Since the 1980s, his shows have focused on an 
irreverent representation of Italian politicians and political parties. After 
he was “banned” from national TV channels, Grillo continued his activity 
in theatre shows, where his denunciation of the political class extended to 
the economic elite and major economic scandals in Italy. A dual rhetoric 
characterised Grillo’s activity in this period (Corbetta & Gualmini, 2013, 
p. 31): the call for citizen mobilisation, and the contraposition between 
the political class and the concepts of innovation and renewal of the po-
litical and economic elite. 
The name of the party stands for the most important issues promoted by 
the Movimento since its early appearances. The five stars stand for the 
five top issues of the movement: public water management, sustainable 
mobility, development, connectivity, and the environment. A collabora-
tion with Gianroberto Casaleggio, an influential entrepreneur in the field 
of marketing and communications, was crucial for the promotion of these 
issues. Within a few months after Beppe Grillo’s famous blog (2005) 
www.beppegrillo.it was set up, it was receiving an average of 150,000 vis-
its daily, and this rose to 500,000 in 2007 (Scanzi, 2012, p. 204). 
Following Mosca (2014), the evolution of the M5S can be summarised 
in 4 phases: latency online (2005/2007); visibility through mass protests 
146
Bulli, G., Soare S. Ch. (2018). Immigration and the Refugee Crisis in a New Immigration Country ...
HKJU-CCPA, 18(1), 127–156
CROATIAN AND COM
PARATIVE PUBLIC ADM
INISTRATION
(2007/2008); entry into the electoral arena (2008/2011); and electoral 
boom and institutionalisation (since 2012). During the latency online 
phase, Grillo’s fame increased both nationally and internationally. In 
2005, Time listed Grillo among the “European Heroes [of] 2005” for his 
constant battle against corruption and financial scandals. In 2008, The 
Guardian included Grillo’s blog among their list of the world’s most visit-
ed blogs. At the same time, Grillo’s online community presence led to an 
overwhelming increase in citizen online activism. The 2005 creation of the 
“meet-up” network, platforms at the local level for the discussion of prob-
lems and issues to be brought to public attention, represented a crucial 
step in the development of the movement (Lanfrey, 2011; Bordignon & 
Ceccarini, 2013). During the second phase, the denunciations of Beppe 
Grillo obtained national visibility through the organisation of provocative 
rallies held in various Italian cities, where the denunciation of the political 
and communication elites reached its peak. The third phase represented 
the entry into the electoral arena, beginning with single candidatures at 
the municipal and regional level (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015, p. 456). 
Promising electoral results were achieved in local elections of 2010 and 
2011. The 2012 local elections confirmed this positive trend with the suc-
cess of the M5S mayor of the city of Parma (Biorcio & Natale, 2013). 
These successes signalled the transition to the fourth and current phase, 
characterised by the 2013 general election result (25.6% of the seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies and 23.6% in the Senate). The party firmly 
declared its intent to remain in opposition, refusing any real negotiations 
with the centre-left party. Administrative elections in 2016 represented a 
very good result for the party: in the capital city of Rome and in Turin the 
candidates of the M5S –Virginia Raggi and Chiara Appendino respective-
ly – both became mayors. 
The electoral result in Rome was particularly indicative of the anti-es-
tablishment sentiment widespread in the city after the discovery of a 
deep-seated system of corruption and links among politicians and persons 
variously associated with organised misappropriation of funds allocated 
by the city administration to manage important city services – one of 
which was immigration reception. The misappropriation of public money 
in this sector constituted a very important segment within the criminal 
network operating under the system that would later be defined as “Ma-
fia Capitale”. As a consequence, the M5S exploited the situation with a 
broad campaign against the candidates of traditional parties. The admin-
istrative elections of 2016 were not the first time the MS5 faced the issue 
of immigration. Although the M5S programme is very synthetic, immi-
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gration, due to its very sensitive nature and its polarising potential, soon 
became an issue at the centre of the movement’s positioning. As early as 
2012 Beppe Grillo had expressed his position on the issue of the change 
in Italian regulations from the ius sanguinis principle to the ius soli princi-
ple – a proposal then being debated by parliament. On his blog, he stated 
that the idea that citizenship should be accorded to people who were born 
in Italy even if their parents were not Italian citizens, “is senseless” (Beppe 
Grillo’s Blog 23rd January 2012 quoted in Tarchi 2015, p. 344). At that 
time, it was still too early to foresee how the debate on this issue would 
become relevant in the final months of the current legislature. 
The migration issue soon became relevant not only per se, but also with 
regard to the party’s organisation. The debate regarding the abolishment 
of the crime of illegal migration introduced in the “security package” 
mentioned earlier in the text (2009) revealed the sensitiveness of the is-
sue. The 2013 parliamentary initiative of two M5S Senate members to 
decriminalise the crime of illegal migration was censored by Grillo and 
Casaleggio, who defined the two senators’ actions as a private initiative. 
A declaration of the leaders of the M5S made it clear that the party did 
not have a settled position on this relevant issue, and pointed at a lack 
of internal democracy within the movement. Political debate on both as-
pects of the issue grew heated until Beppe Grillo’s decision to invoke the 
voice of the people online, which calmed tensions. Consultations were 
held, followed by an online referendum on the issue. Nearly 25,000 voters 
participated out of all the M5S members entitled to vote (80,383). Nearly 
16,000 voted in favour of the depenalisation of the crime, while around 
9,000 voted against. 
The movement celebrated the decision to resort to an online referendum 
as a victory for online democracy. However, the unclear positioning of 
the party on migration would soon emerge again. One of the reasons for 
swinging between the populist rhetoric of Grillo (“immigration is a ta-
boo”, “immigration is a business”) and the more differentiated positions 
of the party base can be interpreted in light of the antagonism towards 
the Northern League. The traditional issue of the LN’s ownership of im-
migration made it difficult for the M5S to identify the correct balance of 
their immigration rhetoric to avoid the risk of being labelled a radical right 
populist party.
The right occasion was represented by the peak of the refugee crisis and 
its management by the Italian government. In 2015, Beppe Grillo’s blog 
hosted a straightforward post. In his words, the clandestine people a por-
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trayed as the new black gold for the mafias and for the cooperatives. They 
remain unidentified for years, remain on Italian land at a cost of 1,050 
euro a month, most of which end up in the pockets of the mafias and 
politicians. Accordingly, for Grillo, the immigration has become a sort of 
clandestine financing for political parties and the mafia (Beppe Grillo’s 
blog August 6th, 2015).
The official positions of the Five Star Movement are represented in the 
document “Programma immigrazione. Movimento 5 Stelle. Programma Par-
ziale 27.07.2017.” The cover of the document shows a ship on the open 
sea, accompanied by the slogan: “Immigration. Objective Zero Landings. 
Italy is not the refugee camp of Europe”. The document begins with a sug-
gestive introduction regarding the scandal of “Mafia Capitale”. It quotes 
a telephone interception of one of the criminals involved in the scandal, 
saying: “I make more money from refugees than from drugs”. The docu-
ment goes on: “The greater the chaos, the more powerful the mafia. For 
the Movimento Cinque Stelle the establishment of fast and reliable pro-
cedures for the recognition of the legal status of the refugee is crucial”.
The traditional enemies of the people (the mafia, and implicitly the Euro-
pean Union and the bureaucracy of current asylum policies) are immedi-
ately invoked in the document, in order to create a Manichean distinction 
between good and evil. The document argues Italy should remove the 
causes that determine the flows of migrants. Selling arms to countries af-
fected by a civil war is proposed, along with the cessation of Third World 
country exploitation, and the establishment of real international cooper-
ation. The allocation of responsibilities to the Italian parties is also clear. 
The Partito Democratico allowed the creation of the Triton programme, 
and the centre-right parties signed the Dublin agreement when they were 
in government. 
An investigation of the positions expressed by the M5S in the European 
Parliament (Franzosi et al., 2015, p. 120) shows that the MEPs of the 
M5S have distanced themselves from the votes expressed by the other 
parties of their parliamentary group (i.e. the United Kingdom Independ-
ence Party) regarding immigration. Nonetheless, the recent denuncia-
tions by one of the party’s most prominent politicians – Luigi Di Maio 
– of the collusive action of the NGOs working in the field of refugee 
reception and the party’s decision not to support the proposed law on the 
passage to the ius soli reinforce the image of an instrumental approach to 
migration issues. 
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6.  Conclusions
Despite the centrality of the public debate on immigration, a detailed 
comparative analysis of international migration flows to Italy shows that 
Italy is not the European country most affected by the consequences of 
international migration. Long established immigration countries, includ-
ing all those who experienced the arrival of migrants much earlier than It-
aly, have been confronted with the phenomenon for a significantly longer 
time. Despite the relative novelty of this issue, international migrations 
have rapidly produced a visible politicisation in the Italian party system, 
in the media, and in broader public opinion. The combined effect of the 
international economic crisis and the rising trend of migrants arriving on 
the Mediterranean coast has exacerbated the salience of the issue, mak-
ing migration one of the primary citizen concerns, as revealed by recent 
Italian and international opinion polls.
Considering the above, our analysis has focused on two populist parties: 
the LN and the M5S. Since the early 1990s and even earlier, if we con-
sider the LN’s anti-southern rhetoric, the party has considered anti-immi-
gration stances to be a key element of their political message. The Lega’s 
increased focus on immigration coincides with both the post-9/11 land-
scape (McDonnell, 2006) and the Eastern enlargement to the point that 
it is possible to identify a total rejection of foreign influence, regardless 
of ethnicity, culture, or religion. The LN operates a so-called “selective 
exclusion” (Betz & Johnson, 2004, p. 318 quoted by McDonnell 2006, 
p. 129), considering immigrants to be not only aliens but also a cultural 
and an economic threat. Particularly in the post-economic crisis period, 
migrants have assumed the role of scapegoats in a discourse increasingly 
based on welfare chauvinism. Since 9/11, the Islamophobic message of 
the LN has grown louder, together with the exaltation of the virtues of 
Christianity. The M5S, on the contrary, makes use of the veneration of 
the people, the denunciation of the corrupt elite, and the myth of the 
people’s sovereignty (Tarchi, 2015), without any visible radical right ele-
ment. In contrast to the LN’s manifest use of nativism, the M5S’s stances 
on immigration are essentially filtered by their emphasis on the people’s 
will. There is no a priori exclusion either in terms of welfare chauvinism 
or in terms of a cultural or religious threat. It is mainly the denunciation 
of the way immigration is managed by the corrupt national elites and/or 
the technocratic elites in Brussels that characterises the M5S discourse.
The political relevance of these parties and their presence in the coalition 
government has succeeded in broadening the coverage of anti-immigra-
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tion stances in the media, rendering nativist positions more credible in 
society (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). As identified by the literature, immi-
gration has become one of the most loaded policy fields in Italian party 
politics. In parallel to more or less tense debates within the institutional 
arena at the local and national level, alarmist news about immigration has 
multiplied in the media and become a central issue in electoral campaigns 
since the early 1990s. Increasingly, Italian politics has come to turn on 
the opposition between inclusive and exclusive attitudes towards immi-
gration. While the literature widely acknowledges the relevance of immi-
gration for the populist family, and the LN confirms this assumption fully, 
the analysis of the M5S demonstrates the ability to switch from inclusivist 
to exclusivist stances and to strategically valorise this fluid position as the 
vox populi.
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IMMIGRATION AND CRISIS IN A NEW IMMIGRATION COUNTRY:  
THE CASE OF ITALY
Summary
Despite the centrality of immigration in public debates, sheer numbers clearly 
demonstrate that Italy is far from being the main destination country for immi-
grants in the EU. However, as emphasized by recent surveys, immigration repre-
sents one of the main preoccupations of Italians. The combined effects of the two 
major crises of the last decade – i.e., the economic crisis and the so-called refugee 
crisis – have induced an increased level of politicisation of immigration. Note 
that immigration has been assessed as one of the most important determinants 
for the successful communication of populist parties since the 1980s. Within this 
context, the Italian case is specific: Italy has only recently become a country 
of immigration. Until the 1970s, the number of Italians emigrating was higher 
than the number of people immigrating to Italy. The reversal of this situation has 
had consequences on two levels. At the legislative level, all attempts to regulate 
immigration have been characterised by a constant tension between humanitari-
an-based reasoning and elements in favour of the reinforcement of the rule of law 
and, more specifically, a focus on security and order. At the political level, since 
the early 1990s, the position of the radical right, populist Northern League has 
regularly been synonymous with xenophobia and welfare chauvinism. According 
to their most recent official stances, the Northern League has become increasing-
ly characterised by a full rejection of multiculturalism and immigration. Since 
2010, a new populist party has joined the Italian arena: the Five Star Move-
ment. In their case, the topic of immigration has only recently become a central 
element of the populist agenda. The M5S features unclear and often conflicting 
positions on the topic of immigration. These hesitations are connected with both 
the complexity of the M5S as an organisation and a strategic approach that 
aims to link their political agenda to the voice of the people.
Keywords: Italy, populism, immigration, nativism, policies
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IMIGRACIJA I KRIZA U NOVOJ IMIGRACIJSKOJ DRŽAVI:  
SLUČAJ ITALIJE
Sažetak
Tema useljeništva prednjači u javnim raspravama u Italiji. Iako brojke jasno 
pokazuju da Italija nije glavno odredište useljenika u Europsku uniju, nedavna 
istraživanja govore o velikoj važnosti ove teme za Talijane. S obzirom na učinak 
dviju najvećih kriza posljednjeg desetljeća – ekonomske i tzv. migrantske – tema 
useljeništva postala je uvelike politizirana. Također, ta se tema pokazala izni-
mno važnom za uspješnu komunikaciju populističkih stranaka još od osamde-
setih godina. U ovome je kontekstu slučaj Italije specifičan jer je ta država tek 
nedavno postala useljenička, s obzirom na to da se do sedamdesetih godina više 
Talijana iseljavalo nego što je bilo doseljenika u zemlju. Preokret u brojkama 
utjecao je na dvije sfere: zakonodavstvo i politiku. U sferi zakonodavstva sva su 
nastojanja da se useljavanje regulira obilježena neskladom koji vlada između 
humanitarnog pristupa i onoga koji ide u prilog vladavini prava, tj. usmjere-
nosti na sigurnost i red. U sferi politike stajalište koji zastupa radikalno desna 
populistička stranka Sjeverna liga još je od ranih devedesetih godina istoznačno 
s pojmovima ksenofobije i šovinizma socijalne zaštite. Najnovija službena sta-
jališta Sjeverne lige svjedoče o sve izraženijem potpunom odbijanju multikultu-
ralizma i imigracije. Nova populistička stranka Pokret pet zvjezdica (M5S) 
osvanula je na talijanskoj sceni 2010. godine te je u njezinu slučaju tema use-
ljeništva tek nedavno uvrštena na populistički raspored. Stajalište stranke M5S 
o pitanju imigracije nejasan je i često proturječan. Nesklonost jasnom stajalištu 
povezana je kako sa složenom organizacijom stranke tako i s njezinom strategi-
jom usklađivanja političkih stajališta stranke s glasom naroda. 
Ključne riječi: Italija, populizam, imigracija, nativizam, politike
